Specifies the radio phy associated to this section. Used values are broadcom on brcm47xx, or mac80211 for all other platforms Mechanism, EAP-PSK will be able to provide more sophisticatedĪuthentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)ĪES-128 A block cipher specified in the Advanced EncryptionĪ 16-byte key derived from the PSK that the EAP peer andĪKEP2 An authenticated key exchange protocol please refer toĪn entity that provides an authentication service to anĪuthenticator.The type is determined on firstboot during the initial radio device detection - it is usually not required to change it. Within its protected channel (see Section 3.3). Primitives and protocols that have been reviewed by the cryptographicĮAP-PSK explicitly provides a mechanism to allow future extensions To be hard and error prone, EAP-PSK tries to avoid inventing any newĬryptographic mechanism. Since the design of authenticated key exchange is notoriously known Model that is presented in Section 7.1 of. This choice has beenĭeliberately made as a trade-off between simplicity and security.įor the sake of simplicity, EAP-PSK has also chosen a fixed messageįormat and not a Type-Length-Value (TLV) design.ĮAP-PSK has been designed in a threat model where the attacker hasįull control over the communication channel. Support, or Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
#What is a psk setting password
However, as further discussed in Section 8, this prevents EAP-PSKįrom offering advanced features such as identity protection, password Those with little processing power and memory. O Lightweight and well suited for any type of device, especially O Easy to understand and implement while avoiding cryptographic
Restriction to such a primitive, and in particular, not usingĪsymmetric cryptography like Diffie-Hellman key exchange, makes EAP. O Extensibility: EAP-PSK should be easily extensible.įor the sake of simplicity, EAP-PSK relies on a single cryptographic O Security: EAP-PSK should be conservative in its cryptographic Over any network, and in particular over IEEE 802.11 wireless O Wide applicability: EAP-PSK should be suitable to authenticate It should be available quicklyīecause recently-released protocols, such as IEEE 802.11i ,Įmploy EAP in a different threat model than PPP and thus O Simplicity: EAP-PSK should be easy to implement and deploy withoutĪny pre-existing infrastructure.
Protocols and should not be confused with them. Protocols may also refer to a PSK or contain this word in their name.įor instance, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) specifies anĪuthentication mode called "WPA-PSK". Published as an RFC for the general information of the InternetĬommunity and to allow independent implementations.īecause PSKs are of frequent use in security protocols, other This document specifies an EAP method, called EAP-PSK, that uses aĮAP-PSK was developed at France Telecom R&D in 2003-2004. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) provides anĪuthentication framework that supports multiple authentication Generation of the PSK from a Password - Discouraged. Allocation of an EAP-Request/Response Type for EAP-PSK. Rules of Operation for the EAP-PSK Protected Channel. EAP-PSK is designed for authentication overīersani & Tschofenig Experimental ġ. Result indications, but future EAP-PSK extensions may use the channelįor other purposes.
This documentĭescribes the use of this channel only for protected exchange of Successful for both parties to communicate over. Protected communication channel when mutual authentication is Protocol (EAP) method for mutual authentication and session keyĭerivation using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK). This document specifies EAP-PSK, an Extensible Authentication The IESG thinks that this work is related to IETF work done in WGsĮMU and EAP, but this does not prevent publishing. This document should exercise caution in evaluating its value for Has chosen to publish this document at its discretion. Or inappropriate interaction with deployed protocols. Purpose and in particular notes that the decision to publish is notīased on IETF review for such things as security, congestion control, IETF disclaims any knowledge of the fitness of this RFC for any This RFC is not a candidate for any level of Internet Standard. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.ĭiscussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the InternetĬommunity. The EAP-PSK Protocol: A Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Request for Comments: 4764 France Telecom R&D
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